By Ajai
Shukla
Business Standard, 20th May 15
The
Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), in its report for the year
ending March 2014 has examined “Issues relating to Design, Development,
Manufacture and Induction of Light Combat Aircraft (Air Force)”, the indigenous
fighter now called the Tejas Mark I.
Media
reports have dwelt mainly on CAG’s criticism of the LCA, such as the delays that
led to the fighter --- cleared in 1983 and intended to enter service in 1994
--- eventually taking 30 years to obtain Initial Operational Clearance (IOC) in
December 2013. The IOC is a landmark at which the fighter can be inducted into
air force service. The CAG report says Final Operational Clearance (FOC) ---
which clears a fighter for combat --- of the LCA is likely only by December
2015.
CAG’s criticism
The CAG says
the LCA that has got initial operational clearance fell short of Air Staff
Requirements (ASR) --- a key document that lays out the LCA’s essential capabilities.
With many of these capabilities still lacking, the IAF could grant initial
operational clearance only with 20 permanent waivers and 33 temporary
concessions. These 33 shortcomings --- which include increased aircraft weight,
inadequate speed, reduced internal fuel capacity and the absence of an
electronic warfare suite --- are to be made good before final operational
clearance is granted, or in the LCA Mark-II, expected by December 2018.
The CAG
report nowhere recognises that, in fighter design anywhere, prototypes
invariably go overweight while accommodating all the capabilities and weaponry
that the users optimistically specify. Then, while paring down weight, some
capabilities are diluted, in consultation with the user air force. In this, the
LCA has trodden a well-worn path.
The CAG also
finds the LCA’s claimed indigenization exaggerated. While the Aeronautical
Development Agency (ADA), which oversees the LCA project, has estimated the
LCA’s indigenous content to be 61 per cent (see graphic at bottom), the CAG says it
"actually worked out to about 35 per cent" as of January 2015. In
arriving at this percentage, the CAG does not differentiate between essential
design-related and high technology aspects of the LCA and readily available
products.
Criticising
the slow pace of the LCA’s entry into service, the report notes that Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd’s (HAL’s) manufacturing facilities can build just four fighters annually
against an envisaged requirement of eight fighters per year. The CAG overlooks the
fact that the IAF has ordered only 20 LCAs with another 20 promised after the
fighter obtains final operational clearance. Even so, HAL is enhancing production
to 16 LCAs per year, a decision that a future CAG report might comment on
unfavourably if more IAF orders are not forthcoming.
The media, focused
on criticism of the LCA, has overlooked the report’s praise for having
successfully developed a modern fighter aircraft. The CAG “appreciate(s) the
efforts made by ADA and its work centres in the indigenous development of LCA
which is comparable to many contemporary aircraft in the world…”
Getting it right
Essentially,
the CAG report is an auditor’s review of a complex, high technology platform
development, which involves risks and uncertainties that are not easily captured
in a simple balance sheet assessment of targets and budgets. Any assessment of
the LCA must start from the fundamental question: what was the objective of developing
this fighter? All such programmes choose between two objectives: either utilising
readily available technologies to build a fighter that could rapidly enter
operational service, e.g. the Sino-Pakistani JF-17 Thunder, which is a cleverly
re-engineered MiG-21; or pursuing a “technology leapfrog” in building a
next-generation fighter, developing new technologies alongside the fighter itself.
Obviously, this would take longer, since inevitable delays in the new
technology areas would delay the project further.
India’s
defence planners went fundamentally wrong in simultaneously attempting both
things: building a fighter quickly to replace the retiring MiG-21s, while also
attempting, as a “catch-up nation”, to leapfrog technology ambitiously.
From the
outset, the LCA was based on fourth-generation (Gen-4) technologies. The first
of these is its “unstable design”, which makes it more agile and manoeuvrable
than “stable” aircraft that are designed to hold the path they are flying on.
Unstable design requires an on-board digital flight control computer that continuously
trims the flight controls. A systems failure would be catastrophic, so the
flight control system has four levels (quadruplex) backup, a sophisticated
design challenge.
Second, the
LCA is constructed largely of composite materials that are lighter than
conventional metal alloys. This results in a lighter fighter that can carry
more fuel and weapons. Third, the LCA has “microprocessor-based utilities”,
which means that computers control all the on-board systems like fuel, weapons,
environment control, etc. Fourth, the LCA has an all-glass cockpit, in which
conventional dials are replaced by intelligent multi-function displays, and the
pilot can fly, aim and operate weapons through a helmet-mounted display.
“In our
very first attempt, we went in for a frontline, state-of-the-art aircraft. It
was complete technological audacity to decide, ‘We’ve never built a fighter
before but we’ll start with a Gen-4 design’. Astonishingly, we’ve managed this
feat, albeit with delays”, says an ADA official who works at the cutting edge
of the LCA programme.
Confrontation, not cooperation
Given the
conflict between a high-risk development path and the need to induct fighters
quickly, the stage was set for confrontation between the users (IAF) and the
developers (ADA, HAL, et al). A former ADA chief says, “The core challenge is managing
technology risk. The users demand more and fast; but you don’t have the
technology in your hand. This pits the IAF versus DRDO.”
Consequently,
the LCA programme has seen more confrontation than cooperation between the IAF
and ADA. The CAG notes that, as early as 1989, an LCA Review Committee had
recommended the “Need for a Liaison Group between Air HQ and ADA to ensure
closer interaction between the design team and the user”. Yet, “no such liaison
group was formed and active user (Air HQ) participation in the LCA Programme
started only after November 2006, which also impacted the LCA development.”
Even as the
IAF criticised ADA, its demands for additional capabilities in the LCA kept
delaying the operational clearances. The CAG report points out that in December
2009, the air force asked for the R-73E air-to-air missile to be integrated
with the LCA’s radar and the pilots’ helmet mounted displays. The CAG also
blames the air force for taking too long to identify a “beyond-visual-range
(BVR) missile” for the LCA. Continuing IAF demands for modifications still
prevent the LCA design from being frozen for production.
Unlike the
IAF, the navy adopted the Naval LCA programme from the start, committing
personnel and over Rs 900 crore from the navy budget. Says former naval chief
and distinguished fighter pilot Admiral Arun Prakash, “The navy knows the
importance of indigenisation, having experienced how foreign aircraft like the
Sea Harrier fighter and Sea King helicopter were grounded for lack of support.
Unlike the air force, we are not critically dependent upon the LCA, since we
have the MiG-29K. But we will support it because it is an Indian fighter.”
The cost-overrun myth
Taking on
from the CAG report, numerous media reports have suggested that the LCA’s
development cost has ballooned 25-fold, from the initially sanctioned Rs 560
crore to the current budget of Rs 14,047 crore. Both figures are incorrect.
This newspaper’s detailed analysis of the LCA budget (February 22, 2011, “When a sword arm is worth it”) quoted
the ADA chief, PS Subramanyam, who clarified that Rs 560 crore was not the
budget for the entire Tejas programme, but merely for “feasibility studies and
project definition”, which also included creation of the infrastructure needed
for the new fighter.
The
infusion of funds for actual design, development and building of prototypes
only began in 1993, with the funds allocated under the heading of “full scale
engineering development”. (see graphic below)
Equally misunderstood
is the figure of Rs 14,047, which includes the cost of developing both the IAF
and naval LCA, covering both the Mark I version as well as Mark II. As the
graphic illustrates, the air force Tejas Mark I has so far cost Rs 7,490 crore,
and is within its budget of Rs 7,965 crore.
Building capability, not just a fighter
For that amount,
tiny compared to the billions that get sucked into developing fighters abroad,
ADA says it has developed not just the LCA (and built 16-17 flying prototypes)
but also an aerospace ecosystem --- DRDO laboratories, private industry,
academic institutions, and test facilities like the National Flight Testing Centre (NFTC) --- that would allow India to
build advanced fighters in the future.
Pushpinder
Singh, noted aerospace expert and publisher of Vayu magazine, points out that
the LCA has overcome all its major technology challenges. What remains, he
says, is to tackle the final problems of converting it into a product ---
issues like freezing specifications, evolving maintenance procedures and
manuals, and the continuing challenge of establishing a fast-moving production
line.
“Nothing
prevents us from reconfiguring the technologies we have mastered through the
LCA into indigenous fifth-generation aircraft like the Advanced Medium Combat
Aircraft (AMCA) and the futuristic Unmanned Aerial Combat Vehicle (UCAV). The
LCA has been an invaluable springboard and the AMCA will galvanise ‘Make in
India’ more than anything done so far”, says Singh.
======================
Graphic: Details of LCA indigenisation
(Source: CAG Report for period ending March 2014)
Serial No
|
Description of work
|
Indigenisation
level projected
|
1
|
Aerodynamic design
|
100 per cent
|
2
|
System architecture
|
100 per cent
|
3
|
Structural design
|
100 per cent
|
4
|
Manufacture of structure
|
95 per cent
|
5
|
General systems
|
85 per cent (import: heat exchangers, pumps, sensors)
|
6
|
Metallic materials
|
80 per cent
|
7
|
Engines
|
Fully imported
|
8
|
Avionics
|
80 per cent (import: displays, generators, ring laser
gyros, electronics
|
9
|
Software
|
100 per cent
|
10
|
Flight control system
|
40 per cent (import: actuators, sensors)
|
11
|
Radar
|
Indigenous (import: electronic components)
|
12
|
Aircraft integration
|
100 per cent
|
13
|
Ground test rigs
|
100 per cent
|
14
|
Flight testing
|
100 per cent
|
|
|
|
Total indigenous content
|
61 per cent
|
